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The Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo ruled that spending limits, including the
amount a candidate can spend on his or her own campaign from personal funds (also
known as personal fund expenditure limits) are unconstitutional.  The Court did,
however, uphold a system of spending limits, on the condition that they are voluntarily
accepted in exchange for some form of public financing.  As a result of these Court
rulings, the concept of various incentives toward voluntary compliance with a personal
funds expenditure limit has been developed.  This report discusses some constitutional
issues raised by two such incentives:  public subsidies and variable contribution limits.
An amendment to S. 27 (McCain/Feingold), SA 115 (Domenici) (approved 70 to
30 on March 20, 2001), would raise the limits on contributions to a Senate candidate
whose opponent exceeds a designated level of personal funding in his or her campaign.
Origin of Incentives Toward Compliance With Personal Funds
Expenditure Limit
Legislation to impose mandatory expenditure limits on the amount a candidate can
spend on his or her own campaign from personal funds (also known as personal fund
expenditure limits) is unlikely to be upheld as constitutional.  In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S.
Supreme Court expressly ruled that limits on personal expenditures by candidates from
personal or family resources are unconstitutional.1  Similar to limitations on independent
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the First Amendment: Buckley v. Valeo and its Supreme Court Progeny, by L. Paige Whitaker.
2 Id. at 52 (citations omitted).
3 Id. at 52-53.
4 Id. at 57 n. 65.  Specifically, Buckley upheld the current presidential public financing system
whereby public subsidies are offered in exchange for spending limits in the primary and general
presidential elections.  See 424 U.S. at 97-108.
5 Id. at 90-93.
6 Id. at 57 n. 65.
expenditures, the Court found that such restraints impose "a substantial restraint on the
ability of persons to engage in protected First Amendment expression."2  A candidate has
a First Amendment right to advocate vigorously and tirelessly for his or her own election,
according to the Court.  Further, the Court noted, it is particularly important that
candidates have the "unfettered opportunity" to communicate their views and positions on
the issues in order for the electorate to make an informed vote.3
The Buckley Court did, however, uphold a system of voluntary spending limits
conditioned on the acceptance of some form of public financing.4  According to the Court,
public financing is within the constitutional powers of Congress to reform the electoral
process and does not violate any First Amendment rights by abridging, restricting, or
censoring speech, expression, and association, but rather encourages public discussion and
participation in the electoral process.5  Specifically, the Court held:
Congress may engage in public financing of election campaigns and may condition
acceptance of public funds on an agreement by the candidate to abide by specified
expenditure limitations.  Just as a candidate may voluntarily limit the size of the
contributions he chooses to accept, he may decide to forgo private fundraising and
accept public funding.6  
As a result of these Court rulings in Buckley, the concept of various incentives toward
voluntary compliance with a personal funds expenditure limit has been developed.
Public Subsidies (or “Trigger Provisions”) 
It appears that a proposal providing public subsidies (or the opportunity to raise more
money) to candidates participating in a personal funds expenditure limit, when their
opponents have exceeded certain levels of spending from personal funds, could be upheld
as constitutional so long as the public subsidy incentives (also known as “trigger
provisions”) are not found to coerce candidates into accepting the spending limits.  We
caution that the Supreme Court has not provided specific guidance as to the
constitutionality of trigger provisions, although the issue has been examined by some lower
courts.
For example, in Gable v. Patton, the Sixth Circuit upheld a state trigger provision
whereby the candidate participating in spending limits can raise money over the spending
limit and continue to receive matching public funds (in a 2:1 ratio) if the non-participating
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candidate spends any amount above the limit.  The court acknowledged that due to the
trigger provision, a non-participating candidate receives no relative advantage from the
spending limit, while the two-for-one matching public funds subsidy provided to the
participating candidate assesses “a substantial cost for nonparticipation.”  Further, the court
found, “there is only a narrow set of circumstances under which a candidate could make
a financially rational decision not to participate.”7  Nevertheless,  the court held that this
type of financial pressure is not sufficient coercion to render the spending limit program
unconstitutional: “Absent a clearer form of coercion we decline to find that the incentives
inherent in the Trigger provision are different in kind from clearly constitutional
incentives.”8
In Rosenstiel v. Rodriguez,9 the Eighth Circuit upheld a Minnesota state statutory
trigger provision under which candidates participating in spending limits in exchange for
receiving public subsidies are released from the limits if opposed by candidates who exceed
the limits.  Further, the statute provides that a participating candidate is then permitted to
raise private funds without limit and permitted to keep the public subsidy funds of up to
50% of the spending limit.10  The Eighth Circuit found that by allowing the participating
candidates to be released from the spending limits, the state is simply attempting “to avert
a powerful disincentive for participation in its public financing scheme,” that is, “a concern
of being grossly outspent by a privately financed opponent with no expenditure limit.”11
Moreover, in holding that the statute was not coercive, the court determined that it
afforded the non-participating candidate “control” over whether and when the participating
opponent candidate would be released from the spending limits and that, therefore, the
statute actually worked “in favor of, rather than to the detriment of, the nonparticipating
candidate.”12  In fact, the court concluded, the triggering provision at issue created a
“choice-increasing framework” that “promotes, rather than detracts from, cherished First
Amendment values.”13
Similarly, it appears that a proposal to offer a tax credit to contributors to candidates
who have complied with a personal funds limit on expenditures could be upheld.  Like
reduced postal rates, a tax credit is a form of public subsidy, as it uses funds that would
otherwise go to the Treasury.14  In Rosenstiel, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals also
upheld a Minnesota state tax refund statutory scheme against a challenge that it was not
voluntary, but coercive.  The court found that a tax refund, when used with other public
CRS-4
15 101 F.3d at 1551.
16 Although the issue was not raised in any case we examine, a challenge to the constitutionality
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17 4 F.3d 26, 37 n. 13 (1st Cir. 1993).
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19 Id. at 38.
funding to encourage candidates to accept spending limits, was “simply an additional public
subsidy provided to participating candidates” and was therefore, constitutional.15
 
Variable Contribution Limits (or “Cap Gap” System)
Under certain circumstances, a proposal that allows candidates who agree to spending
limits from personal funds to accept larger contributions than those who do not participate
in such spending limits could pass constitutional muster.  Under such a proposal, the
differing contribution limits are often referred to as “variable contribution limits” and the
system itself is often referred to as a “cap gap” because it creates a gap between the caps
on contributions permitted to be made to participating versus non-participating candidates.
 
When a court evaluates the constitutionality of a cap gap provision, it will consider
whether the overall statutory framework providing for spending limits is truly voluntary,
as the Supreme Court in Buckley required, or coercive.  While the Supreme Court has not
provided specific guidance as to how to make this determination between voluntary and
coercive, some lower courts have considered the issue.16  For example, the First Circuit in
Vote Choice, Inc. v. DiStefano upheld a Rhode Island state statute imposing a $1,000 limit
on contributions to non-participating candidates, while allowing participating candidates
to accept contributions of up to $2,000 per donor.17  Here, the court recognized that the
statutory scheme was “not in exact balance,” suspecting that “very few campaign financing
schemes ever achieve perfect equipoise,” ultimately holding that the law was not unfairly
coercive.  Moreover, the Vote Choice court determined, a statutory framework that merely
provides candidates with a “voluntary alternative to an otherwise applicable, assuredly
constitutional, financing option” does not impose a First Amendment burden.18
The Vote Choice court cautioned, however, that there is a point where “regulatory
incentives stray beyond the pale, creating disparities so profound that they become
impermissibly coercive.”19  That is, if the additional contribution amounts that participating
candidates may accept are too much larger than the contribution amounts that non-
participating candidates may accept, the disparity might render the program
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unconstitutional.  For instance, a Kentucky federal district court invalidated a state
statutory system in which the cap gap, in effect, created a 15-1 disparity in favor of those
who accepted the spending limits, stating that it was not aware of any case in which a
disparity of greater than 2 to 1 was upheld.  Further, the court found that “[w]hile there
need not be absolute equality between the contribution limits, the disparity must not be so
great as to ‘destroy the voluntariness of the public-financing system.’”20
